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ABSTRACT 
 
The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections produced a record proportion of women MEPs 
overall (37 per cent). Yet, these results vary widely across countries and parties. This article 
aims to explain these variations, evaluating not only who the elected representatives of the 8th 
European Parliament are, but also how they got there. Are the paths to the EP the same for 
women and men? Are there gender differences in terms of MEPs’ political experience? We 
utilise a unique data set listing more than 700 elected MEPs and their background, party and 
country characteristics to empirically examine who makes it to the EP and through which 
route. The results of the analysis suggest no significant gender differences in the pathways to 
the European Parliament. Yet, parties matter: more women were elected to the 8th EP from 
left-wing than from right-wing or ‘new’ parties, and both men and (especially) women 
representing right-wing parties tend to be politically more experienced than their fellow 
MEPs from other types of parties. Furthermore, we find that men are more likely than women 
to be promoted straight from party office to the European Parliament, suggesting that some 
pathways to the EP are less open to women than others. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections were arguably the most important such 
elections to date. Debates over the role and scope of the EU were highly politically salient – 
including debates over the EU’s handling of the Eurozone crisis and the merits of austerity 
measures, as well as plans for further political and economic integration. Also at stake, for the 
first time, was the election of the Commission President. The elections, as expected, resulted 
in gains for anti-European parties on the right and left in many countries, including the UK, 
France and Greece. Yet, the 2014 EP elections were also notable in that they produced a 
record proportion of women MEPs overall (37 per cent).  
 
This electoral outcome provides further weight to the argument that the EP is more 'women-
friendly' than most national parliaments, where the share of women MPs tends to be 
significantly lower. Yet, while there is a large body of research dedicated to the relationship 
between gender, candidate recruitment and women’s representation at the national level (see 
for example Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Caul 1999; Kittilson 2006), decidedly less 
attention has been paid to the recruitment and representation of women in arguably less 
competitive 'second-order' elections, including elections to the EP. The research that does 
exist on women's representation in the EP, meanwhile, provides a more nuanced picture, 
highlighting cross-national as well as cross-party variations in EP election results (see for 
example Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger 2014, 2015; Luhiste 2015). Indeed, in 2014 there 
were significant cross-national differences in the exact share of women elected to the EP, 
ranging from over 50 percent in Croatia, Ireland, and Finland to less than 20 percent in 
Hungary, Cyprus and Lithuania. These differences could be partly caused by the fact that 
most political parties do not have an unlimited supply of high quality, experienced candidates 
to occupy the positions they must fill at various levels of government (Pemstein et al 2015). 
The question, then, is how parties 'split' their supply of high quality candidates between 
different electoral levels and who, in the end, gets sent to the European Parliament. 
Uncovering and exploring these differences, therefore, requires a deeper exploration of the 
political pathways to the EP. 
 
This article, therefore, seeks to investigate, at the individual level, who the elected 
representatives of the 8th European Parliament are and how they got there. Are the paths to 
the EP the same for women and men? Do different types of parties endorse similar 
candidates? Are there gender differences in terms of MEP’s political experience? Individual 
decisions at the candidate level do not take place within a vacuum; they are shaped by the 
broader features of the party and political system (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1997). 
As such, the central aim of this article is not only to examine potential differences in the 
background of male and female MEPs, but to investigate how varying party and country 
characteristics – such as party ideology, the adoption of candidate quotas, and the supply of 
female politicians at the national level– influence men's and women's political pathways to 
the EP. Utilising a unique data set listing more than 700 elected MEPs and their background, 
party and country characteristics, we examine who makes it to the 8th EP through which 
route. Importantly, we develop an MEP-based, rather than solely party- or country-based 
approach that allows us to simultaneously take into account MEP, party, and country level 
characteristics. The results of the analysis suggest no general gender differences in terms of 
MEPs prior experience. However, men, more often than women, enter the EP directly from 
party office, without holding a prior elected seat, while women are more likely to turn their 
incumbency into an elected seat in the 8th EP. Moreover, party characteristics matter: more 
women are elected to the 8th EP from left-wing than from right-wing parties, and women 
representing right-wing political parties tend to be older than their fellow MEPs from other 
types of parties. 
 
WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
 
It is commonly assumed that women’s representation is higher at the EU level than the 
national level. Indeed, the evidence confirms that, in general, women have higher levels of 
descriptive (numerical) representation in the EP than in the lower legislative houses of the EU 
member states, a pattern which has been consistent across three decades of direct European 
elections (Vallance and Davies 1986; Norris 1997; Footitt 2002; Freedman 2002; Kantola 
2010). In 2014, women were 37 per cent of the EP, compared to 27 per cent of MPs across 
the national parliaments of the 28 EU member states. 
 
Kantola (2010) outlines four central explanations for why there are more women in the EP 
than in European national parliaments. First, institutional circumstances may differ because 
some countries have different electoral systems for the two parliaments. Since 1999, MEPs 
have been elected on the basis of proportional representation (PR), though member states are 
free to choose their own voting system within these common principles. It is well-established 
in the literature on women’s representation that women candidates generally tend to do better 
in PR electoral systems with multi-member constituencies, than in plurality or majority 
systems with single-member districts, as are used in British and French national elections, for 
example (see for example Rule 1987; Paxton 1997; McAllister and Studlar 2002). Recent 
research in this area, however, offers mixed findings as to the impact of electoral rules on 
women’s numerical representation in the EP. While Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2014) 
find that variations in electoral rules between EU member states do not have a systematic 
impact on the number of women among all candidates, studies focusing on viable candidacy 
suggest that the use of closed-list PR increases women’s party-determined viability and 
chances of being elected to the EP (Luhiste 2015). 
 
The second explanation for the higher proportion of women representatives in the EP centres 
around the argument that the style of politics is different in the EP compared to some national 
parliaments. Footitt (2002) shows that women MEPs consider the European Parliament more 
‘women-friendly’ than other political bodies, primarily because the hours are more 
structured, committee work involves discussions rather than debates, and the politics in 
general is less confrontational than, for example, politics in the British parliament.  A third, 
and related, explanation is the fact that the EP is a relatively new institution, with the first 
direct elections taking place in 1979, leaving less chance for the establishment of men’s 
incumbency advantage and opening up more opportunities for women to be selected and 
elected. 
 
The fourth set of explanations offered for the more gender equal composition of the EP is that 
the EP is considered less important and attractive when compared to national-level politics. 
EP elections are frequently classified by scholars as ‘second-order’ events, in that they 
resemble local or regional elections rather than ‘first-order’ presidential or parliamentary 
ones which lead to the formation of a government (Marsh 1998; Hix and Marsh 2011).  The 
argument is that there is ‘less at stake’ in second-order elections (SOE) than in first-order 
elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Schmitt 2005), which may increase women’s chances for 
more equal representation. Because SOEs are thought to be less important, the selection and 
election process is not as competitive as becoming a member of the national parliament, 
which may facilitate women’s candidacies (Kantola 2010). Additionally, the fact that there is 
‘less at stake’ may make SOEs less attractive for male candidates, opening up more 
opportunities for women candidates to stand than in first-order elections (Chiva 2014). 
Moreover, parties may see SOEs as an opportunity to ‘prove’ their gender equality 
credentials by fielding larger number of women candidates in less important elections (Kovář 
and Kovář 2012).  
 
However, these kinds of explanations have become less convincing over time. The EU has 
changed dramatically in recent years, both in scale and in scope, while successive EU treaty 
amendments have increased the power of the European Parliament. There is, then, arguably 
much more at stake now in EP elections – both for voters and for political parties – which 
may make the process of becoming an MEP more competitive (Fortin-Rittberger and 
Rittberger 2014; Whitaker 2014). Thus given that the proportion of women MEPs has 
increased at the same time that the EP has gained more authority, the argument that ‘where 
there is power, there are no women’ does not seem to hold in this case.  
 
More importantly, while these standard explanations may offer some insights into why 
women’s representation is higher at the aggregate level in the EP, they do not explain cross-
national and cross-party variations in women’s representation at EU-level (for recent 
exceptions see especially Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger 2014, 2015; Luhiste 2015). As 
Figure 1 highlights, women’s representation is not higher in the EP for all EU member states, 
and there is considerable variation across countries and parties in terms of the proportion of 
female politicians that they send to the EP, casting doubt on the assumption that getting 
elected to the EP is necessarily easier for women than obtaining a seat in a national 
parliament.  
 
(FIGURE 1 HERE) 
 
THEORISING GENDERED PATHWAYS TO THE EP 
 
In seeking to explain these variations, this article asks the question of which women are being 
elected to the EP, and how the attributes of these women compare with those of male MEPs. 
Were paths to the 8th European Parliament the same for women and men? Were there gender 
differences in terms of MEPs’ political experience in 2014? Were these differences 
moderated by party and/or country characteristics?  
 
While there is an emerging body of literature on political pathways to and political careers in 
the EP, few studies address how these dynamics might affect men and women differently. 
The small body of work that does exist in this area focuses mainly on the question of whether 
politicians use the Parliament as a ‘retirement home’ or as a stepping-stone to a career in 
national-level politics (Westlake 1994; Scarrow 1997). More recent studies have asked 
whether a new pattern of European political career is in the making, pointing to the potential 
emergence of a supranational political elite (Verzichelli and Edinger 2005; Beauvallet and 
Michon 2010; Whitaker 2014). Yet, with few exceptions, this literature is almost entirely 
gender-blind. For example, Whitaker (2014) argues that the EP is becoming a more attractive 
option for a long-term political career, highlighting the evidence that the average length of 
service of MEPs has increased and that turnover on committees has fallen. Yet, this study 
makes no reference to women or gender, failing to ask, for example, whether career patterns 
and the ‘costs’ of becoming an MEP may differ between men and women. Meanwhile, those 
studies that do refer to gender tend to focus on the role of party- or country-level 
characteristics in shaping descriptive levels of female representation in the EP (see for 
example Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger 2014, 2015), but have not considered whether 
gender shapes the routes and pathways men and women take to the EP.  
 
In light of the wider literature on men’s and women’s access to political office, we expect to 
find gender differences in terms of some aspects of MEPs’ career pathways (see for example 
Murray 2010; Schwindt-Bayer 2011; Franceschet and Piscopo 2014; Allen et al 2014). First, 
we expect to find gender differences in some aspects of legislator backgrounds, reflected in 
the type of past political experience held by female and male MEPs. We anticipate that for 
both men and women, the predominant career pathway will be upwards from other ‘second 
order’ elective experience, including the local or regional level. We argue that this may 
especially be the case for women MEPs, as politics ‘closer to home’ (that is, at the regional or 
local level) is often argued to encourage women’s political participation (see for example 
Ortbals et al 2012). In contrast, we envisage less movement downwards from the ‘first-order’ 
national level. Recent research on MEPs’ careers suggests that fewer MEPs are viewing the 
EP as a ‘retirement home’, instead viewing it as either an attractive career option in itself, or 
as a stepping stone to a national political career (Whitaker 2014). The evidence suggests, 
then, that the goal for European politicians is generally either to move up the career ladder to 
national office, or to stay put. However, while we hypothesise that politicians are unlikely to 
move from national level office to the EP, we expect to see more women MEPs and more 
experienced women MEPs from countries in which women enjoy higher levels of descriptive 
representation at the national level. The expectation here is that in order to have higher shares 
of women in 'first-level' elected office, these countries must have a larger pool of eligible 
female candidates, increasing the likelihood of having higher numbers of women MPs at 
other political levels, including the EP. With regards to incumbency, as above, the wider 
literature on gender and political recruitment suggests that men are more likely to be 
incumbent MEPs than women (see for example Murray 2008). 
 
As already highlighted, analysing gender differences in political pathways to the EP also 
requires paying attention to the wider political and institutional landscape (cf. Norris and 
Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1997; Franceschet and Piscopo 2014). Research on women and 
politics overwhelmingly finds that left parties are more likely to support women’s 
candidacies because they espouse egalitarian ideologies that are centred on promoting 
equality of outcome (Caul 1999; Kenny and Verge 2013). They are also usually more 
strongly linked with women’s movement actors. Parties of the right, on the other hand, 
promote an ‘equality of opportunity’ approach that centres on a gender-neutral understanding 
of access to political power, or that emphasises a more traditional view of women’s roles 
(Rule 1987; Chiva 2014). Leftist parties are also typically the first to introduce gender quotas 
for women’s political representation, which may set in motion a process of ‘contagion’ across 
parties, whereby rival parties will follow suit in order to compete (Matland and Studlar 1996; 
Kenny and Verge 2013; Kenny and Mackay 2014). We would therefore expect more women 
MEPs in the 2014 EP to come from parties of the left, rather than parties of the right.  
 
Other scholars suggest that the left-right dimension is too simple to capture how ideology 
affects women’s representation, arguing instead that researchers should distinguish between 
‘Old Politics’ cleavages of class conflict and ‘New Politics’ issues and cleavages (Caul 1999; 
Kittilson 2006). Research suggests that new parties may be more receptive to the entrance of 
women and other marginalised groups than traditional parties (Matland and Studlar 1996; 
Norris 1996). New parties, irrespective of ideology, may also be more open to newcomers as 
they have fewer entrenched power-holders and incumbents. At the same time, however, we 
recognize that not all new parties are the same – for example, parties of the New Left (such as 
Green parties) might be much more likely to promote women’s representation than parties of 
the radical right. We thus nuance our classification of ‘new parties’ by considering parties’ 
positions on European integration (unification), thereby taking into account one of the 
distinctive features of EP elections in comparison with national parliamentary contests (cf. 
Chiva 2014). Given the EU’s key role from its inception as a gender equality actor (Kantola 
2010), political parties with a positive stance towards further EU unification might be more 
likely to take gender equality concerns into consideration when selecting their candidates. 
Conversely, Eurosceptic parties might be more likely to resist the ‘diffusion of gender 
equality norms’ from the European to the national level (Chiva 2014: 461). We therefore 
expect more women to come from pro-EU parties than Eurosceptic parties.  
 
In EU member states, parties’ menu of choices in terms of candidate selection for EP 
elections is also conditioned by whether the party or state has adopted candidate gender 
quotas (Luhiste 2015). Legal quotas, which are enacted through reforms to electoral laws or 
sometimes constitutions, require that all parties in a particular country nominate a certain 
percentage of female candidates. Voluntary or party quotas, on the other hand, are usually 
outlined in party rules and statues and entail commitments by individual political parties to 
include a specific proportion of women among their nominated candidates. We anticipate 
therefore, that in EU countries with either legal or party quotas (or both), the percentage of 
women MEPs will be higher than in those member states that do not use these measures.  
 
Lastly, we expect to find gender differences between male and female MEPs in terms of basic 
demographic features. We anticipate that as a result of prevailing gender norms that value 
women’s roles as caretakers, female MEPs will enter politics when least affected by family 
responsibilities and motherhood  (cf. Franceschet and Piscopo 2014). For women with caring 
responsibilities in particular, there are costs to being an MEP, including travel back and forth 
between member states and Strasbourg and Brussels (Norris 1997). Thus, we would likely 
see less women MEPs than male MEPs in their 30s and 40s, as women in these age ranges 
are more likely to have child-caring responsibilities that constrain their political careers. 
Instead, we would hypothesise that women MEPs would be largely concentrated on either 
end of the age spectrum. On the one hand, we might expect more women MEPs from the 
ages of 50 and above – comparative evidence suggests that women may delay their entry into 
public office, in part to take time off to raise families (Schwindt-Bayer 2011; Franceschet and 
Piscopo 2014). Overall, however, we would anticipate women MEPs to be younger as a 
group than their male counterparts. Younger women may be more likely to run because some 
of them do not yet have family responsibilities. In addition, men, who tend to have longer 
political careers and are the majority of incumbents, are likely to be more heavily represented 
amongst the older age groups within the European Parliament (cf. Murray 2010), while 
women might be more likely to be new or recent MEPs. We expect this to particularly be the 
case in the 2014 EP elections, where (as above) many of the smaller and ‘new’ parties put a 
significant emphasis on bringing in ‘new blood’ -  including younger candidates (both male 
and female) with little political experience1. Given the above highlighted 'costs' of being an 
MEP, we also control for the distance to Brussels.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
                                                            
1 Data on marital status and number of children was not available for most MEPs, so we did 
not include these variables in our analysis, although we acknowledge that additional research 
in this area would be very useful. 
To empirically examine who makes it to the EP through which route, we utilise a purpose-
built unique data set listing all 751 elected MEPs to the 8th EP. To compile the data set, we 
downloaded the full list of MEPs, elected in 2014, from the European Parliament website. 
From the same source, we gathered information on each MEP’s sex, age, and national and 
European party (group) affiliation. As the aim of this article is to uncover the routes MEPs 
have taken to the 8th EP, we then systematically searched and examined MEPs’ personal and 
party websites to collect information on their past political background. In addition, we 
utilised existing data sources, such as the 2014 European Election Study (EES) Voter Survey, 
FEMM Committee (2014) report, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s database, to gather 
data on each MEPs party and country characteristics. All this information was then added to 
our data set, resulting in the first comprehensive new data source on the individual MEPs 
elected in 2014.  
 
Our central variable of interest is MEPs’ prior career position, held immediately before being 
elected to the European Parliament2. We use two different measures of prior career position 
in our analysis. First, we distinguish between five categories of prior career position: (1) 
incumbent MEP, (2) national level political office (both legislative and government), (3) 
regional or local level political office (both legislative and government), (4) central, regional, 
local, or EP level party office, and (5) no political office. Secondly, we utilise a dummy 
variable of whether an MEP held an elected office, at any level, immediately before being 
elected to the 8th European Parliament or not, with not holding an elected office being the 
reference category. MEPs who were incumbents, members of national, regional, or local 
legislatures, or members of national, regional, or local governments immediately before being 
elected to the EP in May 2014 are classified as holding an elected office. All other MEPs are 
considered as not holding a prior elected office immediately before the May 2014 EP 
elections, independent of whether they had held any elected office further in the past3.  
 
We have linked this individual level data to information on various party and country level 
indicators. We rely on the FEMM Committee (2014) report for information on legislative 
candidate gender quotas and voluntary party quotas. In the 2014 EP elections, seven member 
states (Belgium, France, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain) applied legislative 
candidate gender quotas and in total 26 national parties across all EU member states had 
adopted voluntary candidate gender quotas. We thus use two dichotomous variables – 
voluntary party quotas and legislative quotas – in our models, with no quotas being the 
reference category.  
 
In terms of party ideology, we distinguish between both left-wing and right-wing parties, and 
between pro-EU unification and anti-EU unification parties. Respondents of the 2014 EES 
                                                            
2 In some cases, an MEP may have held a political office in the past but was not an elected 
member of any representative body while the 2014 EP elections took place. Such MEPs are 
considered not to have held a prior elected office because they were not holding it 
immediately before being elected to the 8th EP. 
3 We acknowledge that MEPs with experience in elected office further in the past may differ 
from those with no elected office experience. However, any data on all MEPs’ historical 
political experience is bound to be limited by potential measurement errors, as the 
information publicly available on the current MEPs early political careers is inconsistent and 
irregular.  
Voter Survey4 were asked to place parties on a 11-point scale with regards to their left-right 
ideology5 as well as on their position on European unification6. We utilise the mean values 
the parties received as a proxy of party ideology, with lower values indicating a more left-
wing placement on the left-right dimension and a more Eurosceptic position on the European 
unification dimension7. 
 
In addition, we relied on the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s database for information on 
women’s political representation at the national level in each of the 28 member states. While 
all EU countries are required to utilise a proportional electoral system to elect their MEPs, 
individual member states are free to vary the openness of ballot structure. As past research 
indicates that the openness of ballot structure is likely to influence women’s electoral chances 
(Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger 2014; Luhiste 2015), we control for the presence or absence 
of preference vote option, with the latter being the baseline category. 
 
As the dependent variables of interest are categorical (female/male; prior elected office 
experience/no experience) and the data are clustered by party and country, we employ robust 
standard errors and estimate both logistic regression models without country-fixed effects and 
conditional logistic regression models with country-fixed effects. 
 
RESULTS 
 
In order to explain gendered pathways to the 8th European Parliament, we first explore the 
conditions under which women have higher chances of being elected as MEPs. To examine 
this, we estimate a logistic regression model that includes individual, party, and country level 
characteristics that are known to explain women’s representation. As Table 1 reveals, party 
ideology, the share of women in national legislature, and MEPs’ age account for most of the 
gender variance, while quota rules show little statistically significant impact. Therefore, while 
                                                            
4 As the data on parties’ ideological positions, measured by the Comparative Party Manifesto 
(CMP) project, were not available while writing the manuscript, we have had to rely on 
alternative sources. 
5 Respondents of the EES 2014 Voter Survey were asked the following question concerning 
up to 8 national political parties: ‘And about where would you place the following political 
parties on this scale? How about the...? Which number from 0 to 10, where '0' means "left" 
and '10' means "right" best describes this party?’  
6 Respondents of the EES 2014 post-election Voter Survey were asked the following question 
concerning up to 8 national political parties: ‘And about where would you place the following 
parties on this scale? How about the (Party X)? Which number from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
“[European unification] already gone too far” and 10 means “[European unification] should 
be pushed further” best describes [Party X]?’ 
7 Respondents of the 2014 EES Voter Survey were not asked to position independent 
candidates or all of the parties that gained representation in the 8th European Parliament on 
the left-right and EU unification scale. This means that some elected MEPs resulted with 
missing values, reducing the final sample size to 707 MEPs. As a result, MEPs with no 
national party affiliation (independents) and MEPs representing very small parties (usually 
the only MEPs from the given party) are missing from the sample. However, there are no 
statistically significant gender differences across the MEPs’ prior elected office backgrounds 
dependent on whether they are included in the analysis or not. Also, analysis including all 
751 MEPs (but including a simplified categorical variable for measuring party ideology) 
yields to similar results with regards to other co-variates of interest. 
quota rules are designed to increase the number of women among candidates, their 
effectiveness in increasing the probability of electoral success for women remains limited. 
 
Overall, left-wing parties are significantly more likely to have a female representative to 
Brussels than right-wing parties.  The magnitude of the effect is quite large, with an MEP 
being a woman being 18 percentage points higher for the most left-wing party compared to 
the most right-wing party. Hence, our data confirms the theoretical expectations of left-wing 
parties embracing more egalitarian ideologies and thus promoting more gender equal 
representation than other types of parties. While parties which are more Eurosceptic tend to 
be less likely to have women MEPs than more Europhile parties, these results fail to reach 
traditional levels of statistical significance (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 also shows that country level characteristics matter. The higher the proportion of 
women parliamentarians at the national level, the more likely member states are to elect more 
women to the EP. For example, if women constitute 20 percent of elected representatives in 
the national legislature, the probability of a woman representing this country in the EP is .34 
compared to .42 for a country in which the share of women among MPs is 40 percent (Table 
1). These results suggest that countries with higher levels of descriptive representation may 
be better able to ‘afford’ to send more women to Brussels as they are more likely to have a 
larger supply of high quality, experienced women candidates.  
 
(TABLE 1 HERE) 
 
MEPs’ age also explains gender variance in the EP. As we expected, women MEPs tend to be 
younger than male MEPs. The estimated probabilities suggest that the likelihood of the 
youngest MEP being a woman is more than 25 percentage points higher than the likelihood 
of the oldest MEP being female. These results point to a generational change: the gradual 
replacement of older MEPs is likely to lead to higher levels of women’s representation in the 
EP. However, when examining the relationship between age and party ideology in the EP, 
this assumption no longer fully holds. The estimates illustrated in Figure 2 show that age 
decreases the likelihood of the MEP being a woman for left-wing parties but not for right-
wing parties8. While the probability of sending an older woman of more than 60-years of age 
to Brussels is very low for all types of parties (and does not vary in a statistically significant 
way across party ideologies), left-right ideology is an important determinant of MEP’s gender 
in the younger and middle-aged cohort. The age differences amongst female MEPs are 
smaller when it comes to the EU-unification dimension. Yet, more Europhile parties have a 
statistically significantly higher likelihood of having middle-aged female representatives in 
the 8th EP than more Eurosceptic parties9. Due to significant differences in the probabilities of 
having younger and middle-aged female representative across party ideologies, generational 
change will likely be constrained by which types of parties are electorally stronger. 
 
                                                            
8 Parties that received from the EES 2014 Voter Survey respondents a mean value smaller or 
equal to 6.66 (median value for all the parties) on the left-right scale, are classified as left-
wing parties. Parties that received a higher value than that, are classified as right-wing 
parties. 
9 Parties that received from the EES 2014 Voter Survey respondents a mean value smaller or 
equal to 5.83 (median value for all the parties) on the EU unification scale, are classified as 
Eurosceptic parties. Parties that received a higher value than that, are classified as Europhile 
parties. 
(FIGURE 2 HERE) 
 
As an initial investigation of the relationship between gender and political experience, we 
estimated a logistic regression model with and without country fixed effects explaining 
individual MEPs' likelihood of either having or not having prior elected office before entering 
the EP. As Table 2 reveals, women, in general, are just as likely as men to hold a previous 
elected political office (either at the EP, national, or local level). Moreover, the finding that 
parties do not send inexperienced women (or men) to the EP may again indicate that the EP is 
not considered as 'second-order' by party gatekeepers as some media commentators and 
researchers often assume. It is also noteworthy that the findings presented do not vary 
substantially across countries. In the majority of countries, the percentage of women with 
prior elected office experience is similar to the share of men holding an elected seat prior to 
being voted into the 8th EP. However, in Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia women are 
considerably more likely than men to have held a prior elected office, while the opposite 
applies for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, and Malta. All of the outliers represent 
countries with very small EP delegations, meaning that the noted gender differences within 
these member states can often be the result of only one male or female MEP not having held 
a prior elected office.  
 
Table 2 also shows that MEPs representing Eurosceptic or left-wing parties are less likely to 
have held an elected office before entering the 8th EP compared to the MEPs from more 
Europhile or right-wing parties, respectively.  This is likely to be the case due to the fact that 
many of the Eurosceptic parties competed for the first time in the 2014 European Parliament 
elections and/or lacked political representation at the national level. Moreover, many parties 
put a deliberate emphasis on selecting candidates with no (or limited) political experience to 
distinguish themselves from mainstream parties – in the Italian 5 Stars Movement, for 
example, there was some controversy over the candidacy of now-MEP Giulia Moi, who was 
accused of hiding previous political experience.  
 
The results in Table 2 also point to a weak candidate quota effect. The model without country 
fixed effects but with additional country level control variables indicates that MEPs 
representing parties that apply voluntary candidate quotas are more likely to have held an 
elected office before being voted into the 8th European Parliament (see Model 1 in Table 2). 
This effect, however, loses traditional levels of significance in a model including country-
fixed effects.  
 
To further examine the impact party characteristics have on MEPs’ pathways to the European 
Parliament, Models 2 and 4 in Table 2 include interaction effects of MEP gender and party 
characteristics. In addition, our data indicate that women from parties that use candidate 
gender quotas are just as likely to have held an elected political office before entering the 8th 
EP in 2014 as women from parties without such rules. Furthermore, women MEPs from 
countries with legal candidate quotas are more likely than women from countries with no 
such rules to have prior elected office experience. This means that the potential ‘quota 
women’ are no less politically experienced than women from parties and countries without 
quota rules (in fact, they may be more so). Also, given that the MEPs elected from parties 
that employed candidate quotas are somewhat more likely to have held a prior elected office 
but this effect does not vary by gender, this further indicates that the quota measures tend to 
increase the overall level of experience of elected MEPs and not that of only women or men. 
While the negative interaction effect of gender and left-right party ideology suggests that 
women MEPs representing right-wing parties are somewhat more likely to have held prior 
elected office than women from left-wing parties, these results do not yield to traditional 
levels of statistical significance.  
 
(TABLE 2 HERE) 
 
While the initial analysis show no significant gender differences with regards to MEPs’ prior 
experience in elected office, we still need to investigate whether women and men enter the 
EP from a similar type of elected (or non-elected) office. In order to test this, we estimated a 
multinominal logistic regression model predicting the likelihood of the MEP being an 
incumbent, having held a national or a regional level political office, coming from a party 
office, or having no prior political experience. As Figure 3 reveals, there is the highest 
probability of an MEP being an incumbent compared to other prior career position options. 
Moreover, women MEPs have a slightly higher probability (.49) of being incumbents than 
men (.48 probability), though the difference is not statistically significant. The analysis thus 
indicates that once women manage to get elected to the EP, they are at least as likely as men 
to hold on to their elected seat. 
 
In contrast, while the probability of an MEP being a political outsider does not vary 
considerably by gender (.12 for women, .11 for men), the likelihood of a male MEP coming 
from a party office is statistically significantly higher than the probability of a woman 
entering the EP directly from a party office (.10 for women compared to .15 for men). Hence, 
in a situation where a politician does not hold an elected seat before the EP elections, parties 
may be more likely to facilitate an upward career move for men working in the party office 
compared to women. Alternatively, it is also possible that the supply of men in party office is 
greater than that of women, explaining the subsequent effects.  
 
As can be seen from Figure 3, in most cases, women and men MEPs do not differ 
substantially from each other in terms of prior career position. The probability of being a 
political outsider or coming from either national or regional/local level political office is the 
same for both men and women MEPs. Interestingly, the probability of entering the EP from 
national elected office (.16 for women and .18 for men) is much higher than that of coming 
from regional/local level politics (.12 for women, .10 for men). Thus the analysis suggests 
that political careers are more likely to move downward (from national level to the European 
level) than upward (from regional/local level to the European level) for both female and male 
MEPs. These results may be explained by the increasing salience of European issues in 
national politics as well as by the increasing importance of the European Parliament in EU 
level politics, thus making the EP less of a second order office than traditionally perceived.   
 
(FIGURE 3 HERE) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The 2014 European Parliament Elections confirm, on aggregate, that women are better 
represented in the EP than in most national parliaments, while also highlighting cross-
national and cross-party variations in the numbers of women elected at European level. In 
seeking to explain these variations, this article has explored the MEP, party and country level 
characteristics that shape men’s and women’s pathways to the EP, offering new insights into 
who the members of the 8th European Parliament are and how they got there.  
 
Our investigation of the gendered pathways to the EP yields some surprising findings in light 
of previous work in this area. Existing research on women’s descriptive representation at the 
national level suggests that the best predictors of women’s legislative representation are 
institutional factors, including the type of electoral system in use and the implementation of 
gender quotas. Our study confirms that the wider context does matter for female politicians in 
European elections, showing, as we expected, that more women MEPs are elected from 
countries with higher levels of women’s representation at the national level. However, we 
find that other institutional factors – including gender quotas and electoral ballot structure - 
are not statistically significant in explaining the gender variation among MEPs. The question, 
of course, is not just whether quotas are ‘on the books’, but whether they are actually 
followed, pointing to the need for further research into the implementation of these measures 
at EP level. 
 
What matters most in explaining levels of women’s representation in the European 
Parliament is parties - our findings suggest that gains in women’s representation at EP level 
continue to be constrained by party ideology. Research on women and politics has 
increasingly challenged the received wisdom in the field with regards to party ideology and 
leftist dominance on women’s representation, pointing, for example, to the increasing number 
of women selected and elected by conservative parties around the world (see for example 
Celis and Childs 2014). Yet, in contrast to these findings, our study highlights the continuing 
importance of the traditional left-right cleavage for women’s representation in the EP, with 
more women elected from left-wing parties than from right-wing parties. Moreover, we find 
that MEPs’ pathways to the European Parliament vary by party ideology, with parties on the 
right of the political spectrum and/or holding more pro-European unification attitudes 
sending more experienced politicians to the EP than left-wing parties and/or more 
Eurosceptic parties. We assume that the reason why women MEPs from right-wing parties 
are more experienced than their colleagues from left-wing parties is partly due to the fact that 
women representing left-wing parties tend to be younger, while the likelihood of a female 
MEP from a right-wing party does not vary much by age. This suggests that right-wing 
parties keep promoting the candidature of young men over young women, thereby reducing 
the chances that generational replacement alone will solve the issues of women’s political 
underrepresentation. 
 
Overall, however, we find that women’s and men’s paths to the European Parliament are 
more similar than different – women and male MEPs have comparable levels of prior 
political experience in elected office and, in fact, women MEPs have a slightly higher 
probability of being incumbents than men, indicating that once women make it to the EP, 
they have a good chance of being re-elected. Moreover, women from parties that use 
candidate gender quotas have similar levels of political experience as women from parties 
without quota rules, findings which correspond more broadly to research on the effect of 
quotas on the types of women elected to legislatures at the national level (see for example 
Murray 2010; Schwindt-Bayer 2011; Franceschet and Piscopo 2014; Allen et al 2014). In 
fact, women MEPs from countries with legal quotas are more experienced than women from 
countries without such rules. On the one hand, these findings may bolster the efforts of 
campaigners seeking to promote women’s representation, confirming that while women 
MEPs may be numerically under-represented, they are just as ‘qualified’ as their male 
counterparts. Yet, on the other hand, these findings may suggest that women are simply 
replicating traditional gendered pathways to political office, rather than bringing different 
experiences and backgrounds to the European Parliament, raising wider questions as to the 
potential impact on the substantive representation of women’s policy concerns (cf. Allen et al 
2014).  
 
The most common prior career position of the MEPs of the 8th EP is an elected seat in the 
previous assembly of the European Parliament, while the second most likely pathway is 
through national level political office. Men, however, are more likely than women to be 
promoted straight from party office to the European Parliament, suggesting that women may 
still be excluded from some elite political networks. These findings indicate that the EP may 
serve, on the one hand, as an individual career path to which politicians aspire. Once 
candidates have managed to secure a seat, they tend to hold on to it, confirming findings from 
other studies that point to the rise of ‘European careerists’ and the emergence of a supra-
national political elite (see for example Whitaker 2014). On the other hand, the fact that the 
second most likely pathway to the European Parliament, for both men and women, is through 
national level elected office may suggest that the EP is becoming less of a second order office 
than traditionally perceived, raising questions as to whether progress on women’s 
representation at European level will continue as the EP becomes a more desirable option for 
a political career.    
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Figure 1: Percentage of Women MEPs and MPs by country, 2014 
 
  
Table 1: Explaining gender variation among elected MEPs (Logistic regression coefficients) 
  Coef. (S.E.)   Change 
Age (in years) -0.02 (0.01) ** -0.26 
Party ideology: Left-Right (std.) -0.19 (0.09) * -0.18 
Party ideology: EU unification (std.) 0.11 (0.08) 
 
0.15 
Voluntary party quota -0.01 (0.01) 
 
-0.08 
Legislative quota -0.03 (0.19) 
 
-0.01 
Preference voting -0.21 (0.17) 
 
-0.05 
Distance to Brussels -0.05 (0.06) 
 
-0.03 
% women MPs 0.02 (0.01) + 0.14 
Constant 0.13 (0.37) 
  
    
N (level 1) 707 
  
N (level 2) 28 
  
Wald chi2  120.01 
  
Prob > chi2 0.00 
  
Peudo-R 2 0.22     
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Change represents the maximum change in probability of the independent variable holding all 
other variables constant and their means and modes. 
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Figure 2: Estimated probabilities of electing a female or a male MEP by age and party 
ideology 
 
Note: Estimates represent the probability of the elected MEP being a woman. Estimates are 
derived from the logistic regression model (Table 1) with robust standard errors; broken line 
represents 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 2: Explaining the likelihood of holding prior political office (Logistic regression coefficients)  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coef. (S.E.)   Change Coef. (S.E.)   Coef. (S.E.)   Coef. (S.E.)   
Woman 0.09 (0.25) 
 
0.02 -0.27 (0.27) 
 
0.06 (0.21) 
 
0.20 (0.26) 
 
Age (in years) 0.05 (0.01) ** 0.46 0.06 (0.01) ** 0.05 (0.01) ** 0.05 (0.01) ** 
Party ideology: Left-Right (std.) 0.33 (0.10) ** 0.24 0.42 (0.13) ** 0.23 (0.10) * 0.15 (0.06) * 
Party ideology: EU unification 
(std.) 
0.31 (0.17) + 0.32 0.34 (0.17) * 0.40 (0.11) ** 0.33 (0.13) * 
Voluntary party quota 0.04 (0.01) ** 0.13 0.02 (0.01) 
 
-0.02 (0.04) 
 
-0.04 (0.04) 
 
Legislative quota -0.11 (0.37) 
 
-0.02 -0.46 (0.34) 
     
Preference voting 0.01 (0.29) 
 
0.00 0.09 (0.28) 
     
% women MPs 0.02 (0.02) 
 
0.11 0.02 (0.02) 
     
          
Woman * Left-Right 
   
-0.24 (0.18) 
   
-0.22 (0.22) 
 
Woman * EU unification 
   
-0.11 (0.20) 
   
0.02 (0.22) 
 
Woman * Party quota 
   
-0.23 (0.67) 
   
-0.79 (0.56) 
 
Woman * Legislative quota 
   
1.17 (0.42) ** 
    
Constant -1.99 (0.62) ** 
 
-1.96 (0.66) ** 
    
          
Country-fixed effects No 
  
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
N (level 1) 707 
  
707 
 
694 
 
694 
 
N (level 2) 28 
  
28 
 
26 
 
26 
 
LR chi2 / Wald chi2  61.33 
  
185.13 
 
52.33 
 
57.74 
 
Prob > chi2 0.00 
  
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
AIC 714.94     711.35   578.54   583.13   
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Change represents the maximum change in probability of the independent variable holding all other variables constant and their means and 
modes.
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Figure 3: Predicted probabilities of prior career positions for women and men MEPs 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities are obtained from a multinominal logistic regression model 
(with robust standard errors), controlling for MEPs age, party ideology, candidate quotas, 
openness of ballot structure, and proportion of women in national parliament. All other 
variables are held constant at their means and modes. 
 
